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Tobacco related illnesses resulted in approximately 4 million deaths worldwide in 
2003. By 2030 the expected annual death toll is expected to rise to 10 million, of 
which seven million are expected to be in developing countries (World Bank, 1999). 
The human suffering caused by smoking is immense. Studies in developing countries 
(USDHHS, 2000: 97 and Jha, et al., 2000a: 158) have shown that a majority of 
current smokers want to quit the habit, but find it very difficult to do so. 
 
Epidemiological research indicates that for every four regular smokers, on average 
one will be killed by their habit before age 69 and another in old age (i.e. after age 69) 
(Galalakshmi, et al, 1999: 34). For those people who die before age 69, it has been 
estimated that they lose, on average, approximately 20 life years because of smoking. 
 
International agencies like the World Health Organisation (WHO) have placed 
tobacco control high on the agenda. Through the Tobacco Free Initiative the WHO 
has initiated the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). The FCTC was 
unanimously accepted in May 2003 and is currently being ratified by the signatory 
countries. In an increasingly integrated world, an integrated response to the challenge 
of increasing global tobacco consumption is required. The FCTC aims to lay down 
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certain minimum standards in tobacco control that signatory countries would make 
part of their domestic legislation. 
 
Specifically, the FCTC aims to reduce the consumption of tobacco through the 
following measures aimed at reducing the demand: 
• Price and tax measures; 
• Protection from exposure to environmental tobacco smoke; 
• Regulation and disclosure of the contents of tobacco products; 
• Packaging and labelling; 
• Education, communication, training and public awareness; 
• A comprehensive ban on tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship; and 
• Tobacco dependence and cessation methods (Shibuya, et al., 2003). 
 
The FCTC aims to curb the supply of tobacco through the following means: 
• Eliminating the illicit trade of tobacco products; 
• Restricting the sales of tobacco to and by minors; and 
• Supporting economically viable alternatives for tobacco growers.  
 
The FCTC has been vigorously opposed by the tobacco industry. One can understand 
their opposition, given that their vested interests are being threatened. In fact, the 
tobacco control debate sometimes is presented as a struggle between the public health 
interests of the medical community and the commercial interests of the tobacco and 
related industries. The tobacco industry often presents itself as an economically 
important industry, employing many people, and an important source of government 
revenue (see, for instance, Prince, 2003, on the role of the tobacco industry in the 
Jamaican economy). 
 
While this may be true, the industry tends to ignore the fact that its product causes not 
only non-economical costs on its users (e.g. pain and suffering and grief of relatives), 
but because of premature mortality and increased morbidity also places a heavy 
economic burden on society. Rather than focusing on the gross contribution of the 
industry on society, a more realistic assessment would be to consider the net 
contribution. A number of studies (see Chaloupka, Jha and Peck, 1998 and Peck, et 
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al., 1999) have performed cost-benefit analyses and the results suggest that, if some 
smokers are uninformed about the health consequences of their habit, an increase in 
the excise tax on cigarettes will enhance global welfare. 
 
The economic rationale for levying an excise tax on cigarettes is based on the fact that 
the social costs of smoking are greater than the private costs. According to Townsend 
(1996: 138) a number of principles underlie the imposition of an excise tax: Firstly, 
taxes are imposed to correct for externalities (i.e. to increase the private cost of 
smoking so that it equals the social cost). Secondly, an excise tax on tobacco is a 
particularly useful way to generate government revenue. Given the relatively low 
price elasticity of demand (discussed in section 4) the Ramsey rule suggests that 
cigarettes are more suitable than many other consumer goods as an object of taxation. 
Thirdly, the tax can be levied to deter tobacco consumption (i.e. the tax is a sumptuary 
tax). It is a popular tax in many countries, indicated by the fact that a majority of 
people, including a sizeable proportion of smokers, support excise tax increases. 
 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the economics of tobacco control in Jamaica. 
The focus will be primarily on the role that an increase in excise taxes has on the price 
of cigarettes and the demand for cigarettes. Empirical estimates of the sensitivity of 
the demand for cigarettes to a change in the price of cigarettes will be provided. Also, 
the implications of a tax increase on government revenue will be discussed. As will be 
pointed out in this paper, the empirical literature is practically unanimous that an 
increase in tobacco excise taxes is the most effective way of reducing cigarette 
consumption. A secondary focus of this paper is to investigate other factors that have 
an impact on the demand for cigarettes. Because of limited data this paper will often 
refer to the experiences of other countries, both developed and developing. 
 
2. THE ROLE OF TOBACCO IN THE JAMAICAN ECONOMY 
 
In Table 1 below some macroeconomic and tobacco related trends are shown for 
Jamaica for the period 1972-2001. From a macroeconomic perspective the past three 
decades have been difficult for Jamaica. Although the rapid decrease in the GDP per 
capita during the early and mid-1970s has been stemmed, the period since 1980 has 
been characterised by economic stagnation, rather than economic growth. Also, the 
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country has been subject to some bouts of high inflation. Fortunately, inflation has 
been brought under control in the past five years.  
 
























1972 1064700 168944  1416 1575  
1973 1093000 174850 20.0 1354 N/a  
1974 1120900 160511 25.0 1380 1400 39.33 
1975 1150600 150646 13.3 1413 1258 39.65 
1976 1174005 135083 11.8 1315 1278 40.76 
1977 1199600 129605 10.5 1233 1209 39.30 
1978 1231000 126489 38.1 1078 1071 42.03 
1979 1260400 121758 27.6 1070 936 36.60 
1980 1289300 112182 27.0 996 940 39.15 
1981 1333400 113716 12.8 934 892 49.15 
1982 1367300 110024 7.5 1034 989 47.42 
1983 1409924 110219 10.5 964 965 46.96 
1984 1438221 106678 28.6 883 843 46.51 
1985 1464188 100924 25.9 897 889 50.36 
1986 1486093 100529 14.7 767 756 54.50 
1987 1499147 107412 6.8 849 842 52.66 
1988 1509338 109617 8.0 863 852 55.56 
1989 1538551 115016 14.8 899 888 49.46 
1990 1559186 120218 21.9 885 865 46.74 
1991 1587095 119481 50.8 768 739 46.70 
1992 1586033 121401 77.5 819 817 41.36 
1993 1606564 122158 21.9 762 762 47.55 
1994 1630268 121425 35.2 781 778 50.75 
1995 1656291 120768 19.9 732 732 53.20 
1996 1678230 117971 26.4 726 724 49.39 
1997 1701153 114301 9.7 691 676 53.29 
1998 1720703 112699 8.7 674 662 58.57 
1999 1736582 111117 5.9 618 608 65.80 
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2000 1752873 110856 8.2 568 562 65.92 
2001 1754936 112592 7.0 585 606 66.09 
Average annual growth rates    
1972-1980 2.4 -5.0 21.7 -4.3 -6.2 -0.1* 
1980-1990 1.9 0.7 15.2 -1.2 -0.8 1.8 
1990-1995 1.2 0.1 41.1 -3.7 -3.3 2.6 
1995-2000 1.1 -1.7 11.8 -4.9 -5.1 4.4 
2000-2001 0.1 1.6 7.0 3.0 7.8 0.3 
* 1974-1980 
Sources: To be supplied by Stanley Lalta and Dr Eva Fuller 
 
Considering per capita production and consumption of cigarettes, there has been a 
sharp decrease in both of these in the past three decades. Per capita consumption of 
cigarettes has decreased by between 50 and 60 per cent since the early 1970s.1 
Aggregate cigarette consumption has decreased by about a third, despite the fact that 
the Jamaican population has increased by 65 per cent between 1972 and 2001. 
 
From a tobacco control perspective this long-term decrease in cigarette consumption 
has been most encouraging. Two questions that arise from this are the following: 
1. Why has there been such a rapid decrease in cigarette consumption in Jamaica 
in this 30-year period? 
2. It is possible that smokers have converted their consumption patterns to other 
forms of tobacco and to cannabis, rather than cigarettes?  
 
Consider the first issue. In section 4.1 a review on the international empirical 
literature on the determinants of the demand for cigarettes is provided. As will be 
pointed out in that section, the empirical literature is overwhelming in its conclusion 
that the two most important determinants of the demand for cigarettes are the price of 
cigarettes and income levels. In Figure 1 the empirical relationship between Jamaica’s 
per capita cigarette consumption and per capita income is shown in the form of a 
scatter plot. The relationship between these two variables is clearly positive. In Figure 
                                                 
1. The data in this table closely corresponds to the per capita cigarette consumption figures 
published in the second edition of the Tobacco Control Country Profiles, published in 2003. 
The per capita consumption figures for 1980, 1990, 1995 and 2000 from the Country Profiles 
were as follows (this table’s data in parentheses): 952 (940), 879 (865), 742 (732), and 565 
(562). 
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2 the relationship between the real price2 of cigarettes and per capita consumption is 
shown. Other than the two axes having been switched (i.e. the price of cigarettes is 
shown on the horizontal axis, rather than the more conventional vertical axis, and the 
quantity is shown on the vertical axis, rather than the more conventional horizontal 
axis), this scatter plot traces out a demand curve for cigarettes in Jamaica. The 
negative relationship between cigarette consumption and its real price is clearly 
demonstrated. If cigarette prices were to have no impact on the quantity of cigarettes 
consumed, the scatter plot in Figure 2 would not have shown any discernable 
relationship.  
 
An analysis of Table 1 indicates that the real price of cigarettes has been increasing 
steadily throughout the three decades under consideration. Unfortunately, the sparse 
data that are available does not allow one to fully investigate why the real price on 
cigarettes has been increasing. However, an investigation of cigarette excise duty and 
consumption duty revenues of the 1970s and 1980s suggests that an increase in the tax 
on cigarettes was not primarily responsible for an increase in the real retail price in 
the 1970s and 1980s.3 However, no data are available for the period 1990 to 1997, so 
one cannot say anything about this period. 
 
                                                 
2. The real price is discussed in more detail in section 4.1. To derive the real price of a product 
one removes the impact of inflation on the price of that product. 
3.  The Jamaican Ministry of Health supplied some tentative data on revenues obtained from 
excise duty and consumption duty for the period 1974 to 1990. From these data the average 
tax per pack of cigarettes was calculated. Given the large changes in the price level during 
some of these years, the real values are likely to suffer from some distortion. However, 
keeping these caveats in mind, an analysis of the long-term trend in the real tax suggests that 
the real tax per pack of cigarettes has not shown any long-term upward trend for the period 
1974 to 1990. However, there have been some cycles in the real tax in this period as shown in 
the graph below. 
















































































































While it is acknowledged that the data is not particularly robust, it seems that the main 
explanation for the increase in the real price of cigarettes in Jamaica is not an increase 
in taxes, but rather an increase in that proportion of the retail price that is received by 
the cigarette manufacturing industry and all related industries (such as wholesalers, 
retailers and distribution agencies). 
 
In section 4.2 the relationship between cigarette consumption and its determinants are 
investigated more rigorously by means of multiple regression analysis. 
 
Figure 1: Per capita cigarette consumption vs. per capita GDP, Jamaica, 1974-2001 
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While changes in consumers’ income and changes in the real price of cigarettes 
clearly have had a pronounced impact on the demand for cigarettes, changes in the 
prices of and demand for substitutes to cigarettes could also have had an impact on 
the demand for cigarettes. In Jamaica the most common substitute to cigarettes are 
…… (Stanley and Eva to expand). 
 
A component of the explanation of the decline in cigarette consumption over the three 
decades may well be the increased use of marijuana (ganja) and to a lesser extent, 
other recreational drugs. Marijuana is illegal in Jamaica and obtaining accurate data 
on its consumption is very difficult as is the price of this product. According to a 
survey of the National Council on Drug Abuse (NCDA) among school children (ages 
10 - 18 years) the usage rate of marijuana in 1987 was 20 per cent, and it increased to 
27 per cent in 1997. Over the same period the use of tranquillisers also increased from 
3.8 per cent to 5.5 per cent (Eva Lewis-Fuller, personal communication). 
 
3. CIGARETTE TAXES AND GOVERNMENT REVENUE 
 
As in most countries, cigarettes sold in Jamaica are subject to excise and other taxes. 
The composition of the tax burden is more complex than in many other countries. In 
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• Import duty: 30 % (applicable only on imported cigarettes); 
• Stamp duty: 56 % (applicable to all cigarettes? Question to Stanley and Eva); 
• General Consumption Tax: 15 % 
• Special consumption tax: 
o $128.61 per 100 cigarettes 
o an ad valorem tax of 39.9 % on cigarettes in excess of a benchmark 
value of $252.39 per 100 cigarettes (Prince, 2003). 
 
The focus in this section is on total cigarette tax, irrespective of the source. Cigarette 
taxation is an important source of government revenue, responsible for XX per cent of 
total revenue (Eva to supply figure). In Table 2 the relationship between some 
important tax-related variables are shown for the period 1997-2001.4 Unfortunately 
the data are limited, but some important trends can nevertheless be inferred.  
 
Table 2: Jamaica’s cigarette taxes, 1997-2001  






















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1997 2022 1458 57.51 25.36 47.6 
1998 2346 1557 56.93 27.35 46.7 
1999 2563 1606 52.77 30.44 46.3 
2000 2716 1573 49.29 31.93 48.4 
2001 2762 1496 53.17 28.14 42.6 
Sources:  
Prince, 2003 (for cigarette tax revenues) 
Stanley and Eva to supply sources for consumption, cigarette prices and CPI 
 
Firstly, it is evident that total cigarette tax revenues, in nominal terms, have been 
increasing at a steady rate over the past five years. This is something that the tobacco 
industry would regularly point out. However, because of inflation practically all 
magnitudes measured in monetary terms tend to increase in nominal value over time. 
A far more appropriate approach is to consider real changes (i.e. where the impact of 
inflation is removed from the analysis). The picture is significantly different in this 
                                                 
4. Unfortunately it was impossible to synchronise these data with the data of 1974-1990, which 
were used in a previous footnote. 
 10 
case. Real tax revenues from cigarettes increased by about 5 per cent annually in 1998 
and 1999, but decreased by an average of 3.5 per cent per year in the subsequent two 
years. The net result was that real value of total cigarette tax revenue in 2001 was 
only fractionally more than the real value in 1997. 
 
The degree of correlation between real cigarette tax revenue (col. 3) and the real tax 
per pack of cigarette (col. 5) is much greater (r = 0.80) than the correlation between 
real cigarette tax revenue (col. 3) and total cigarette consumption (col. 4, r = -0.54). 
With the exception of 2000, an increase in the real tax per pack of cigarettes has 
resulted in an increase in real government revenue, and vice versa.5 What this analysis 
thus suggests is that, in order to increase tax revenue, the government should increase 
the tax per pack of cigarettes. While an increase in the tax per pack of cigarettes is 
likely to decrease the consumption of cigarettes by some amount, the decrease in the 
quantity is very small in comparison to the increase in the tax per pack of cigarette 
that the government will receive.  
 
This is a very important result. The tobacco industry around the world has often 
argued, and might argue this in Jamaica as well, that increases in the excise tax on 
cigarettes may not result in an increase in government revenue, because the decrease 
in cigarette consumption will nullify the impact of the change in the tax. This 
assertion has been proven false around the world (see Chaloupka and Warner, 1999, 
World Bank, 1999: 72, and ETCSA, 2003), and based on the limited data presented in 
Table 2, does not carry empirical weight in Jamaica either.  
 
Can the government of Jamaica extract more revenue from tobacco by increasing the 
tax? As will be shown in section 5, the answer is a clear yes. It will be shown that, 
despite the long-term decrease in cigarette consumption in Jamaica in the past 30 
years, the government has significant scope to increase the tax on cigarettes. This will 
have positive public health consequences (tobacco consumption will decrease) and 
                                                 
5. In 2000 per capita cigarette consumption decreased by approximately 7.5 per cent, and this 
was responsible for the 2 per cent decrease in real cigarette tax revenue in that year, despite 
the fact that the real tax per pack of cigarettes increased by nearly 5 per cent. The decrease in 
cigarette consumption cannot be ascribed to either a large decrease in per capita income or a 
large increase in the real price of cigarettes. Given the data available, the cause of this 
decrease in cigarette consumption remains unresolved. 
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will also be beneficial to the national treasury (because real tax revenues will 
increase). 
 
DETERMINANTS OF CIGARETTE DEMAND 
 
An international perspective 
 
So what determines the demand for tobacco products? Standard microeconomic 
theory typically identifies the following determinants of the quantity demanded of any 
product: 
• Price of the product; 
• Income; 
• Prices of related products (i.e. substitutes and complements); and 
• Tastes and preferences. 
 
In the international tobacco control literature a number of additional demand factors 
have been identified. These include the following: 
• Legislative interventions aimed at reducing smoking in public places and 
workplaces; 
• Advertising expenditure and restrictions on advertising; 
• Increased awareness of the risks of smoking (e.g. the publication of the Royal 
College of Physicians Report in 1962 and the US’s Surgeon-General Report in 
1964, other “health scares”, and counter-advertising). 
 
From a policy perspective it is useful to know which interventions are effective and 
which are not. In the following sections each one of these determinants of smoking 
will be discussed, based on international experience.  
 
a) Price of cigarettes 
 
Of all the tobacco control interventions, by far the most effective one is increasing the 
price of cigarettes. According to the most well-known relationship in microeconomics 
- the law of demand - the quantity demanded of a typical product will decrease as the 
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price of that product increases. But does the law of demand apply to an addictive 
product like cigarettes? There was a period where it was believed that addictive goods 
are not subject to the law of demand, because people will buy these goods, 
irrespective of the price (see studies quoted in Chaloupka and Warner, 1999: 4). 
However, despite its addictive nature, dozens and even hundreds of empirical studies 
have found that the price of cigarettes is negatively related to the quantity demanded 
(see Chaloupka and Warner, 1999, Van der Merwe, 1998 and the USDHHS, 2000 for 
some surveys). 
 
The price elasticity of demand is a useful concept to quantify by what percentage the 
quantity demanded is likely to decrease in reaction to a 1 per cent increase in the 
price. There is a growing consensus among economists that the price elasticity of 
demand for cigarettes is around –0.4 for developed countries and between –0.4 and –
0.8 for developing countries (World Bank, 1999). What this implies is that for every 
10 per cent increase in the price of cigarettes, the quantity of cigarettes demanded will 
decrease by about 4 per cent in developed countries and by between 4 and 8 per cent 
in developing countries.  
 
A proviso is important. If the average price level in an economy is rising at a rate of, 
say, 10 per cent, and the price of cigarettes also increase by 10 per cent, then 
cigarettes have not become relatively more expensive. In a case like this, the real 
price of cigarettes has remained the same, despite the fact that the nominal price has 
increased by 10 per cent. The quantity demanded is not likely to change, because the 
affordability of cigarettes has not changed. Thus when considering changes in the 
price of cigarettes one should consider the real price, rather than the nominal price. 
 
Through what mechanism does an increase in the real price of cigarettes cause a 
reduction in the quantity of cigarettes consumed? There are basically three ways: 
1. Smokers decide to quit, 
2. Current non-smokers decide not to initiate smoking, and 
3. Smokers smoke less. 
 
The first mechanism (i.e. smokers deciding to quit) applies mainly to adults, while the 
second mechanism (i.e. non-smokers not initiating smoking) applies more to 
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teenagers than adults. The third mechanism (i.e. a reduction in the number of 
cigarettes smoked by smokers) seems to apply to all smokers. Using data obtained 
from comprehensive household surveys, researchers in the US, and more recently in a 
number of East Asian countries have attempted to determine the relative importance 
of these three mechanisms in using an excise-led price change in decreasing cigarette 
consumption (Lewit and Coate, 1981, Wassermann, et al, 1991, Chaloupka and 
Grossman, 1996, Chaloupka and Wechsler, 1997, Mao, et al., 1999, Kyaing, 2003, 
and Karki, et al., 2003).  
 
There is strong evidence that teenagers are far more price sensitive than adults. In 
fact, the price elasticity of demand (in absolute terms) of teenagers is about twice that 
of adults (Chaloupka and Grossman, 1996 and Chaloupka and Wechsler, 1997). The 
implication for tobacco control is that excise tax increases are thus more effective in 
preventing teenagers to start smoking, than in causing adult smokers to quit. 
 
The evidence on the strength of the relationship between (1) cigarette price and the 
probability of smoking and (2) cigarette price and the quantity of cigarettes smoked 
by smokers is less settled. The empirical evidence from the US suggests that about 
half of the decrease in cigarette consumption can be ascribed to a reduction in the 
quantity of smokers (i.e. the probability that a randomly-chosen person smokes 
decreases), while the other half is ascribed to the fact that the remaining smokers 
smoke less as a result of the price increase (Chaloupka and Grossman, 1996 and 
Chaloupka and Wechsler, 1997). In East Asian countries the evidence is mixed, and 
no clear trends emerge, possibly because the data is less accurate and also because the 
countries differ one from another (Karki, et al., 2003, Kyaing, 2003, and Arunatilate 
and Opatha, 2003). 
 
In most countries cigarettes are heavily taxed, often through a variety of taxes. In the 
European Union the minimum tax on cigarettes is 57 per cent of the retail price, but in 
some countries, notably the United Kingdom, Denmark and Norway, more than 75 
per cent of the retail price is comprised of taxes (Chaloupka, et al., 2000: 239-240). 
 
By increasing the tax on cigarettes the government has a direct impact on the retail 
price of cigarettes. The empirical evidence indicates that an increase in the excise tax 
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is fully passed on to consumers. In fact, in the US there is evidence that a given 
increase in the excise tax (which is levied as a specific tax, i.e. a certain amount per 
cigarette) increases the retail price of cigarettes by a greater amount than the initial tax 
increase (see Chaloupka, et al., 2000: 238-242). The tobacco industry, in order to 
maintain its profitability, has the incentive to make a larger profit per cigarette, in 
order to compensate for the decrease in the number of cigarettes sold. Because the 
tobacco industry is highly concentrated in all countries, it has the economic power to 
do this. In Jamaica, where the tobacco industry is a virtual monopoly, the Cigarette 
Company of Jamaica would be able to unilaterally increase the retail price by more 
than the increase in the tax on cigarettes. In South Africa a similar trend is found. 
Between 1993 and 2002 the increase in the real retail price was approximately double 
the increase in the real (specific) excise tax (ETCSA, 2003). Through this strategy, 
the profit per cigarette increased dramatically. The result of this strategy is that the 
cigarette industry in South Africa was more profitable in 2002 than in 1993, despite 
the fact that the quantity of cigarettes sold decreased by about a third over that period. 
Thus, to summarise this paragraph, by increasing the excise tax on cigarettes, 
governments can increase the retail price by at least the amount of the tax increase, 
but more generally the effect of the tax increase is amplified. Of course, this has very 
positive public health consequences. 
 
The tax can be levied in a number of ways. The two most common methods are a 
specific tax (a tax levied as a specific amount per cigarette) or an ad valorem tax (a 
tax levied as a percentage of some specified value). Within these two categories a 
number of refinements are possible, specifically on how the tax authorities define the 
base on which they wish to levy the tax. The definition of the tax base has an effect on 
the likely industry behaviour and the public health outcomes. In Table 3 below a 
number of methods for levying the tax are shown (the categories are not mutually 
exclusive), together with the impact that it might have on manufacturers and on public 
health. 
 
Table 3: Different ways of levying taxes on cigarettes 
 
Tobacco tax Effect on industry Public health impact 
 15 
By weight of tobacco Manufacturers reduce size 
of cigarettes 
Beneficial 
By cigarette Manufacturers increase 
size of cigarettes 
Detrimental 
Specific tax Manufacturers influence is 
limited, but inflation may 
erode 
Beneficial if high 
Ad valorem Manufacturers keep base 
level low 
Limited benefit 
Low tax on non-cigarette 
products 
Smokers switch to 
substitutes to cigarettes 
Limits benefits of the tax 
High tax on high tar Smokers switch to lower 
tar cigarettes 
Slightly beneficial 
Source: Townsend, 1996. 
 
While a specific tax has the potential for the highest public health benefit, it suffers 
from the distinct drawback that it can easily be eroded in times of inflation. Jamaica 
has had bouts of high inflation in the past, but even moderate inflation will erode the 
excise tax quite quickly if the government does not adjust the tax rate on a regular 
basis. In South Africa the real excise tax decreased by 60 per cent between 1980 and 
1990, because the government did not regularly adjust the inflation rate in a period 
when the inflation rate averaged 15 per cent per year (ETCSA, 2003: 52). 
 
Critics of using excise tax increases as a mechanism for tobacco control have argued 
that the tax falls disproportionately heavily on the poor, implying that the tax is 
regressive. Regressive taxes are perceived as unfair and socially inequitable. While 
the empirical evidence shows that this criticism is valid, i.e. the tobacco excise tax is 
regressive (Townsend, 1987 and Townsend, et al., 1994), tobacco control economists 
argue that the solution is not a reduction in the excise tax. Quite the opposite. Even 
though the level of the excise tax is regressive, increases in the excise tax will reduce 
the degree of regressivity. The explanation lies in the fact that the poor are much more 
responsive to price changes than the rich (Chaloupka, 1991, Townsend, et al., 1994 
Onder, 2002 and Arunatilate and Opatha, 2003). Thus a given increase in the price of 
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cigarettes will result in a more pronounced decrease in cigarette consumption among 
the poor than among the rich. The rich are much less likely to give up smoking as a 
result of an increase in the price of cigarettes than the poor. The net effect is that the 
absolute burden of the tax (i.e. the tax amount, expressed as a percentage of 
household income) may increase for both the poor and the rich, but the increase for 




Other than price, consumers’ income is hypothesised to be an important determinant 
of the demand for any product. Empirical studies on the demand for tobacco, based on 
time series data, tend to find that income is an important explanatory variable in the 
demand equation (see survey in Van Walbeek, 2004). Based on time series data, the 
coefficient in the income variable is practically always positive, indicating that as the 
average level of income increases, tobacco consumption increases. Thus tobacco is a 
normal product. However, there is no consensus in the literature on the magnitude of 
the income elasticity of demand,6 other than that it is positive. 
 
The implication of this result is that economic growth has got detrimental tobacco 
control consequences. Of course, few, if any, would argue that an economy should not 
be allowed to grow because of the impact that economic growth has on the demand 
for cigarettes. Nevertheless, this aspect should be borne in mind, especially in 
countries that are experiencing rapid economic growth. Governments that are serious 
in curbing the consumption of tobacco can prevent an increase in the demand for 
tobacco (caused by a growth in average income levels) by making cigarettes less 
affordable. In order to keep per capita cigarette consumption constant, the government 
should, by raising the excise tax, cause an increase in the real price of cigarettes using 
the following formula:  
 
%∆P = %∆Y x εY / εP 
 
                                                 
6. The income elasticity of demand is defined as the percentage change in the quantity demanded 
as the result of a one per cent increase in people’s (real) income. 
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where %∆P is the percentage change in real price, %∆Y is the percentage change in 
per capita income, εY is the income elasticity of demand and εP is the price elasticity 
of demand. 
 
For example, if per capita income is growing by 5 per cent in real terms, the income 
elasticity of demand is 0.6 and the price elasticity of demand is –0.5, then the real 
price would have to increase by 6 per cent to neutralise the impact of the economic 
growth on tobacco demand. 
 
While the relationship between an increase in income and tobacco consumption is 
positive in general, empirical studies based on household survey data suggests that the 
income elasticity of demand can vary quite significantly for different income groups 
(Van Walbeek, 2004). Overall, empirical studies show that poorer people’s tobacco 
consumption is more sensitive to a change in income than richer people (Nasser, 
2003). In fact some studies (see Van Walbeek, 2004) have found that an increase in 
rich households’ income may, in fact, cause a reduction in cigarette consumption. For 
households like these, cigarettes are inferior products. 
 
(c) Prices of related products 
 
There are a number of potential substitutes for cigarettes. In many countries roll-your-
own tobacco, pipe tobacco, snuff and cigars are used as substitutes for tobacco. In 
many Southern and Eastern Asian countries tobacco can be consumed in the form of 
bidis, kreteks, and water pipe, to name a few. The relative popularity of these non-
cigarette nicotine substitutes is often subject to local customs and traditions. For 
example, the proportion of roll-your-own cigarettes in total cigarette consumption is 
much higher in the Netherlands than in other European countries. This difference can 
not be ascribed to higher than average cigarette prices or lower than average income 
levels in the Netherlands, vis-à-vis other European countries. It is simply a Dutch 
peculiarity. 
 
In specifying an empirical demand equation for cigarettes, one should include the 
price of substitutes in the regression equation, to account for the fact that a change in 
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the price of a cigarette substitute may have a significant impact on the demand for 
cigarettes. However, in most econometric studies this is not done. The probable 
reason is that, because the price of cigarettes is often highly correlated with the price 
of the cigarette substitute, the regression equation suffers from an unacceptably high 
degree of multicollinearity. The result is than that the highly correlated variable (i.e. 
the price of the cigarette substitute) gets excluded from the equation. 
 
Intuitively, it is plausible that people will shift to cheaper substitutes if their cigarettes 
become unaffordable. These substitutes can either be cheaper brands or alternative 
products like bidis or roll-your-own tobacco. A study on the smoking behaviour of 
different income groups in South Africa has clearly shown that the poorest 25 per cent 
of the population have dramatically reduced their consumption of cigarettes in 
reaction to sharp increases in the price of cigarettes since the mid-1990s. However, 
there has been a sizeable increase in the consumption of roll-your-own tobacco among 
these poor households, although not so large as to neutralise the rapid decrease in the 
consumption of cigarettes (Van Walbeek, 2004). 
 
The policy implications that follow from this discussion are quite clear. When the 
government decides to increase the excise tax on cigarettes, it should increase the tax 
rate on cigarette substitutes as well. Given that the price of the substitutes, even after 
the across-the-board tax increase, will be lower than the price of cigarettes, some 
substitution is inevitable, but at least the effect is minimised. 
 
One could argue that there are possibly complements to tobacco as well. Research by 
Jimenez and Labeaga (1994) suggests that there is a close correlation between tobacco 
and alcohol consumption. Their research suggests that increases in the tax on alcohol 
may reduce tobacco consumption. However, the causality in their analysis is not 
clear, and the correlation could possibly be spurious. Nevertheless, in future studies 
this aspect may become more important. 
 
(d) Tastes and preferences 
 
Although tastes and preferences are generally regarded as important determinants of 
the demand for a product, they are generally very difficult to model empirically. In 
 19 
practically all developed countries and in many developing countries smoking has 
become increasingly socially unacceptable among many people. There are a number 
of reasons for this: the greater awareness of the harmful impact of environmental 
tobacco smoke, greater awareness about the overall medical impact of smoking, 
active lobbying of non-smokers’ rights associations for smoke-free air, and the 
vilification of the tobacco industry, through, amongst others, the filming of The 
Insider and the publication of incriminating industry documents in the popular press 
and on the Internet, etc. 
 
In empirical work it is very difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish the impact that 
changing tastes have on the demand for cigarettes, separate from other influences. 
Studies that incorporate tastes and preferences in their regression equations tend to 
use a time trend, and assume, rather heroically, that tastes and preferences change 
slowly but consistently over time (Townsend, 1987, Stewart, 1993b, and Onder, 
2002). While this is not very satisfactory, the fact of the matter is that there are 
usually no better alternatives, other than ignoring tastes and preferences altogether. 
 
(e) Legislative interventions 
 
Legislative interventions can take a number of forms, the common ones being the 
following: 
• Restricting smoking in public and work places, 
• Restricting the advertising of tobacco and/or sponsorships by tobacco 
companies (see following section), 
• Printing health warnings on the packets, and 
• Regulating and disclosing the contents of tobacco products. 
 
Studies in the US have found that legislation aimed at restricting smoking in public 
areas (e.g. shopping malls, restaurants and bars) have had a significant impact on the 
overall smoking prevalence in places where such laws were enforced (see survey in 
Chaloupka and Warner, 199: 37). However, the magnitude of the impact of this 
intervention on cigarette consumption is nevertheless modest in comparison to, for 
example, a sizeable increase in the excise tax. 
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Experience from around the world has shown that measures aimed at restricting 
smoking in public places and restricting/banning advertising attracts ferocious 
opposition from the industry. The tobacco industry and related industries (mainly the 
hospitality industry) fear that restrictions on smoking in public places will seriously 
harm the hospitality industry. Studies sponsored by the tobacco industry on the likely 
impact of such restrictions on the hospitality industry generally paint a very gloomy 
picture.7 However, an ex post study by Glantz and Charlesworth (1999) found that the 
hospitality industry is either unaffected by such restrictions, or may even be positively 
affected. 
 
Most countries require the tobacco-manufacturing firms to print health warnings on 
their packaging and advertising material (where advertising is allowed). The size and 
wording of these warnings differ from country to country. Recently Canada and 
Brazil have passed legislation forcing the tobacco industry to place pictorial warnings 
on the packaging and including a detailed description on the way that smoking 
impacts health, rather than having a rather bland warning like “Smoking causes 
cancer” or “Smoking seriously harms your health”. According to Murray Kaiserman, 
who was involved in implementing the new regulations in Canada, public knowledge 
on the medical impact of tobacco has improved dramatically as result of these new 
warnings (personal communication). However, as yet the impact that these pictorial 
warnings have had on the quantity of cigarettes smoked in Canada and/or Brazil has 
not been established. 
 
Empirically it is difficult to establish the magnitude of the impact of certain legislative 
interventions on the demand for tobacco. Where estimates of these magnitudes have 
been obtained, these are generally quite modest, as mentioned above. Does this mean 
that they are not worth pursuing? Certainly not. 
 
                                                 
7. For example, when the legislation on smoke-free restaurants was debated in South Africa in 
1998, the hospitality industry claimed that restaurants would lose as much as 38 per cent of 
their revenues as a result of this legislation, based on a survey that was done by the industry 
body (see Malan and Leaver, 2003, for a good chronology of the imposition of tobacco control 
interventions in South Africa, and the debates that took place between pro- and antagonists).  
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Even though the impact of tobacco control legislation on the demand for tobacco is 
limited in econometric studies, the main contribution of such legislation is that it 
changes societal norms and customs. It helps to denormalise tobacco. Legislation that 
prohibits smoking in public places (and also workplaces) has a significant effect on 
property rights.8 Before the legislation is passed smokers have the right (implicitly or 
explicitly) to pollute the air with their tobacco smoke. The legislation explicitly gives 
non-smokers the right to tobacco-free air. Such legislation does not require an “anti-
smoking police force” to enforce the legislation. All that is required is that smokers 
and non-smokers are aware of the legislation, that appropriate signage is placed in 
public buildings, and that non-smokers point out to smokers that it is illegal to smoke, 
if infringements do take place. Few smokers will flaunt the legislation if there is a 
social consensus that smoking in enclosed public areas is not allowed. 
 
Consider the following example. In South Africa the Minister of Health introduced 
strong tobacco control legislation that included a ban on smoking in public and 
workplaces in 1998. The tobacco industry vehemently opposed the legislation, 
arguing that it would be unenforceable, that hospitality establishments should decide 
their own smoking policies and that the legislation was unconstitutional. Despite the 
protests the legislation was passed and became effective in 2001. Smoking in public 
places has all but disappeared. The only places where some people still smoke 
(against the law) are in bars. Smokers have generally accepted the legislation and the 
degree of compliance is very high. Non-smokers have the benefit of not being 
exposed to tobacco smoke. A large-scale crackdown on smokers, predicted by the 
industry, was not necessary, because social pressure, and the fact that property rights 
had been well established (and were not subject to “good manners” by smokers and/or 
the “putting up with the cigarette smoke” by non-smokers), ensured that smokers 
willingly complied to the legislation. 
 
                                                 
8. Property rights have a specific meaning in economics. For privately owned goods (not 
necessarily fixed property only) the owner has the property right to those goods, and can do 
with those goods what he pleases, e.g. rent it out, use it, sell it and even destroy it. For goods 
that are not privately owned (i.e. belonging to “the community”), like the air around us, parks, 
mountains, rivers, beautiful views, etc. the issue of property rights is more complex. Has 
someone got the right to pollute the air and/or rivers? Can someone build a large building in 
front of someone else’s building and thus ruin the latter’s view? The property rights to such 
communal properties, unless legislated, are thus potentially open to conflicting claims.  
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Other than a study that investigated the relationship between anti-smoking sentiment 
and restrictions on smoking in a variety of public places (Chaloupka and Saffer, 
1992), no study, to the authors’ knowledge, has specifically investigated the impact of 
the changing social climate and societal norms on the demand for tobacco. A 
comprehensive strategy, consisting of strong tobacco control legislation, education 
and publicity, and rapidly increasing excise taxes, is likely to be more effective than a 
fragmented approach. It seems plausible that the effects of the various interventions 
(i.e. consistent increases in the real tax on cigarettes, together with appropriate and 
comprehensive legislation) are amplified when a comprehensive strategy is employed. 
 
(f) Restrictions on advertising 
 
In many countries cigarettes are some of the most advertised products. In fact, until 
recently, cigarette brands were regarded as some of the most recognised and valuable 
brands in the world. 
 
Does cigarette advertising increase the sales of cigarettes? According to tobacco 
control economists the answer is a clear yes. They argue that the tobacco industryhas 
a clear incentive to advertise their product. Firstly, they can present an “adult activity” 
to teenagers as a socially desirable thing to be involved in. By advertising, the tobacco 
industry can play on teenagers’ insecurities and “trick” them into a habit, which they 
later regret they started. Secondly, advertising is inherently misleading, in which a 
deadly product is presented as glamorous, socially acceptable and normal. Thirdly, 
given the amounts of money involved in cigarette advertising, it must be effective; 
otherwise firms would not do it. 
 
On the other hand the tobacco industry argues that they do not advertise to “lure” 
teenagers into smoking, but to maintain existing smokers’ brand loyalty or to 
persuade smokers of other brands to switch brands. Of course this argument wears 
thin when the cigarette market is dominated by a monopoly or near-monopoly, as is 
the case in many developing countries. 
 
Unfortunately the empirical evidence does not provide much guidance. A sizeable 
empirical literature on the relationship between tobacco advertising and the demand 
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for tobacco products exists, but this literature is not conclusive (Chaloupka and 
Warner, 1999: 30-34). The gulf between the “tobacco control position” and the 
“industry position” is huge and insurmountable. Studies that indicate that advertising 
expenditure has a significant impact on total cigarette demand are often severely 
criticised by tobacco industry researchers, sometimes justifiably, but more often out 
of principle, rather than substance (see, for example, Stewart, 1992 and 1993a, Duffy, 
1996 and High, 1999).9 
 
However, even studies that find that advertising expenditure has a significant positive 
impact on cigarette expenditure, the impact is usually not all that large. For most 
studies the econometric evidence suggests that a ban on advertising would reduce 
cigarette consumption by about 6 per cent or less (Chaloupka and Warner, 1999: 30-
34). 
 
The fact that there is no consensus in the econometric literature on the relationship 
between tobacco advertising and tobacco demand has resulted in an alternative 
theoretical explanation about the relationship between these two variables (Saffer and 
Chaloupka, 2000). If one assumes that advertising expenditure is subject to 
diminishing returns, it follows that the last ten per cent of advertising expenditure is 
much less effective than the first ten per cent. Given that most econometric studies 
focus on time series data, where the differences between the various years are often 
not large, it follows that econometric analysis is not likely to “pick up” the effect of a 
change in tobacco advertising on tobacco consumption. The fact that a marginal 
change in advertising expenditure does not have a significant effect on overall 
consumption does not imply that a large change in advertising expenditure will also 
not have an insignificant impact on consumption.  
                                                 
9. The best example of “academic mud slinging” is Stewart’s (1992) criticism of Laugesen and 
Meads’s (1991) analysis of the advertising-consumption debate in the OECD countries, and 
the ensuing debate (Stewart, 1993a, and Laugesen and Meads, 1993). Stewart, in trying to 
discredit Laugesen and Meads’s analysis, nitpicked their data and methodology, without 
showing what the impact would be on the results obtained. In a subsequent paper, Stewart 
(1993b) used essentially a similar approach to find an opposite result. Given the amount of 
effort that Stewart put into his criticism of Laugesen and Meads, it is surprising that in his 
“alternative analysis” seems very sloppy to a casual reader of his paper.  
 This acrimonious debate illustrates the seriousness that the industry places on research that 
finds a positive relationship between advertising expenditure and tobacco consumption. It also 
illustrates the more general point that the industry will do everything in its power to create 
dissenting and alternative views on issues that it regards as important. 
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Using cross-section data for a number of developed countries, Saffer and Chaloupka 
(2000) found that countries that have imposed comprehensive bans on advertising and 
sponsorship experienced far more pronounced decreases in tobacco consumption than 
countries that employed only partial bans. In fact, there is consensus among tobacco 
control economists that partial advertising bans are not all that successful in reducing 
tobacco consumption, because the industry will simply circumvent the partial bans 
(World Bank, 1999: 50).  
 
(g) Health publicity 
 
The first medical and epidemiological reports that linked smoking to lung cancer were 
published in the 1930s and 1940s. The Royal College of Physicians report of 1962 
and the US’s Surgeon-General report of 1964 were the first comprehensive and well-
publicised reports on the dangers of smoking. Since then tens of thousands of studies 
have investigated the relationship between smoking and a variety of illnesses and 
diseases. 
 
In reaction to these reports, many developed countries have implemented a number of 
tobacco control measures, amongst other a health publicity drive. A number of studies 
have investigated the impact that the publicity created by the publication of the 1962 
and 1964 reports had on cigarette consumption in the UK and US respectively 
(Sumner, 1971, Atkinson and Skegg, 1973, Peto, 1974, Witt and Pass, 1981 and 
Townsend, 1987). Generally these “health scares” have resulted in a decrease in 
tobacco consumption, but the effect seems to have been transitory, in that tobacco 
consumption gradually moved back to the pre-report levels, holding other factors 
constant (Atkinson and Skegg, 1973 and Witt and Pass, 1981).  
 
4.2 The demand for cigarettes in Jamaica: a multiple regression approach 
 
In section 2 two scatter plots were shown that indicated a positive relationship 
between cigarette consumption and per capita GDP and a negative relationship 
between cigarette consumption and the real price of cigarettes. The aim of this section 
is to estimate the magnitude and strength (i.e. statistical significance) of the 
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relationship between the demand for cigarettes in Jamaica and those factors that 
determine it. 
 
Despite the fact that there have been major advances in both theoretical and applied 
econometric techniques in the past decades (see, for instance Harris, 1995), a more 
modest approach at estimating the demand for cigarettes is used in this study, given 
the limited quantity of data and the potential for data errors in these data. In the 
context of this study, using advanced techniques on data that may be subject to 
measurement and other errors will probably result in an image of sophistication that is 
unjustified. A standard ordinary least squares (OLS) approach is used, and a number 
of specifications will be presented, that will indicate the relationship between the 
demand for cigarettes and various combinations of independent variables. 
 
The primary aim of this section is to estimate the price elasticity of demand for 
cigarettes. A secondary aim is to investigate the income elasticity of demand. As was 
pointed out in section 4.1, the international literature indicates that these two factors 
are by far the most important determinants of the demand for tobacco. The demand 
equations will be estimated in both aggregate and per capita terms. Where 
appropriate, a lagged dependent variable will be included in the regression equation. 
This allows one to investigate the magnitude of the short- and long-run price 
elasticities of demand, respectively.10 Also, the mathematical form of the regression 
equation is specified in both linear and loglinear form. For the linear specification, the 
coefficients have little meaning in themselves (other than indicating a positive or 
negative relationship), but the elasticities can easily be calculated. The standard 
approach is followed and the elasticities are calculated at the means. For the loglinear 
specification, the coefficients are interpreted as (constant) elasticities.  
 
In total eight specifications have been specified and estimated. The regression output 
is presented in the Appendix, while the summarised results are shown in Table 4. 
 
                                                 
10. Given an equation ln Qt = α + β1 ln Qt-1 + β2 ln Pt, the short-run price elasticity of demand is 






















(1) Loglinear Aggregate -0.48 na P < 0.001 0.01 P = 0.98 
(2) Linear Aggregate -0.47 na P < 0.001 0.01 P = 0.94 
(3) Loglinear Aggregate -0.22 -0.38 P < 0.05 -0.05 P = 0.70 
(4) Linear Aggregate -0.22 -0.37 P < 0.05 -0.05 P = 0.70 
(5) Loglinear Per capita -0.98 na P < 0.0001 0.51 P < 0.1 
(6) Linear Per capita -0.80 na P < 0.0001 0.89 P < 0.005 
(7) Loglinear Per capita -0.23 -0.97 P < 0.2 -0.05 P = 0.83 
(8) Linear Per capita -0.18 -0.73 P = 0.23 -0.03 P = 0.89 
Note: a low P value (P < 0.1) indicates that the coefficient is statistically significant.  
 
A number of observations can be made about Table 4. Firstly, the specification of the 
regression equation has a very pronounced effect on the results that are obtained. It 
would be unscientific and misleading to say that “the price elasticity is x”, because 
any deviation in the specification on which this statement is based would result in a 
very different price elasticity estimate. Thus rather than presenting only one price 
elasticity estimate, a number are presented. Secondly, despite the fact that the price 
elasticity estimates are heavily dependent on the specification of the regression 
equation, there is strong and consistent evidence that the price elasticity (1) is 
statistically significant and (2) has a value of between 0 and –1, i.e. the demand for 
cigarettes is price inelastic, but is certainly not perfectly inelastic.11 Thirdly, where 
long-run elasticities of demand are calculated, they are between 1.8 and 4 times the 
absolute magnitude of the short-run elasticities. However, even in the long run, there 
is no evidence that the price elasticity of demand is greater than one in absolute terms. 
Fourthly, with the exception for two specifications (equations 5 and 6), the income 
elasticity of demand is generally small and insignificant. This suggests that changes in 
income (in these specifications approximated by changes in the real GDP) have not 
had a significant impact on the demand for cigarettes in Jamaica. This result is at odds 
                                                 
11. Where a lagged dependent variable is included in the regression equation (which is necessary 
to calculate the long-run elasticity of demand), the statistical significance of the price variable 
is diminished. The primary reason for this is that the lagged dependent variable tends to 
dominate the regression equation (see the R2 values in the Appendix), which means that all 
other independent variables tend to be “overwhelmed” and lose their statistical significance. 
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with the bulk of the international literature, which found a positive relationship 
between income and the demand for cigarettes (see section 4.1 (b)). 
 
5. IMPACT OF A TAX CHANGE ON CIGARETTE CONSUMPTION 
AND GOVERNMENT REVENUE 
 
The previous section indicated that  
(1) the estimate for the price elasticity of demand is sensitive to the specification 
of the regression equation,  
(2) the real price of cigarettes is an important and statistically significant 
determinant of the demand for tobacco,  
(3) the short-term price elasticity of demand lies between –0.2 and –1.0, although 
most specifications suggest an elasticity estimate in the lower, and 
(4) the long-term price elasticity, where estimated, is between 1.8 and 4 times 
greater than the short-term price elasticity. 
 
The aim of this section is to use perform some sensitivity analyses, based on the 
current situation in Jamaica, to establish the likely impact of a change in the cigarette 
tax on (1) cigarette consumption, and (2) total government revenue from cigarette 
taxes. 
 
The analysis is based on the following assumptions: 
(1) The situation in 2001 is taken as the base scenario (more recent data are not 
available). The price per pack of cigarettes is J$ 122, the average tax per pack 
is J$ 51.95 (resulting in an average tax burden of 42.6 per cent), aggregate 
consumption is 53.17 million packs, and government revenue from cigarettes 
is J$ 2762.1 million. 
(2) The real retail price consists of two components: tax and the remainder, which, 
for lack of a better word, will be called the “industry price”, 
(3) When the real cigarette tax increases, it is assumed that the real industry price 
is unaffected by the change in the tax.12 The implication of this assumption is 
                                                 
12. However, as discussed in section 4.1 (a), this is not always the best assumption to make, 
because the tobacco industry may have an incentive to increase the real retail price by more 
than the increase in the real amount of the tax. Should this happen, the benefit to the Ministry 
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that the supply curve is perfectly elastic. Thus the increase in the tax is borne 
exclusively by the consumers, not the tobacco industry, 
(4) In this example the real cigarette tax (i.e. the amount of tax per pack of 
cigarettes) is assumed to increase by 10 per cent. Should the increase be more 
or less than 10 per cent, the magnitudes of the changes in cigarette 
consumption and government income will change, but the changes will be 
proportional to the change in the real cigarette tax. 
 
By increasing the real cigarette tax by 10 per cent, the average tax per pack increases 
from J$ 51.95 to J$ 57.14. On the assumption that the real “industry price” is not 
affected by this change in the tax, the retail price will increase from J$ 122 to 
J$ 127.20. 
 
The interesting issue is what will happen to cigarette consumption and government 
revenue. Of course this depends crucially on the estimated value of the price elasticity 
of demand. Rather than using an arbitrary value, the results of a number of 
simulations, in which different price elasticities of demand are used, are shown in 
Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Simulation results  
 
 Impact of a 10 per cent increase in the cigarette tax, given different 
price elasticities of demand 
Price elasticity of 
demand 
Percentage change in 
aggregate cigarette 
consumption 
Percentage change in 
government revenue 
 
(1) (2) (3)  
0.0 0.00 10.00  
-0.1 -0.43 9.53  
-0.2 -0.85 9.06  
-0.3 -1.28 8.59  
-0.4 -1.70 8.13  
-0.5 -2.13 7.66  
-0.6 -2.55 7.19  
-0.7 -2.98 6.72  
-0.8 -3.41 6.25  
-0.9 -3.83 5.78  
                                                                                                                                            
of Finance will be decreased to some degree, because the additional price increase (over and 
above the increase in the amount of the tax) will cause an additional reduction in the quantity 
consumed that is not explained by the increase in the amount of the tax. However, the public 
health benefit will be amplified, because people are going to cut back their cigarette 
consumption by more than what the tax-induced price increase would have achieved by itself. 
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-1.0 -4.26 5.32  
-1.1 -4.68 4.85  
-1.2 -5.11 4.38  
-1.3 -5.54 3.91  
-1.4 -5.96 3.44  
-1.5 -6.39 2.97  
 
In Table 5 the price elasticities range between 0 (i.e. perfectly inelastic) and –1.5 (i.e. 
relatively elastic). Given the regression results in the previous section and the vast 
empirical literature that was touched on in section 4.1, it is most probable that the true 
value of the price elasticity of demand is in this range. The likely range for the true 
value of the price elasticity of demand is between –0.3 and –0.6.  
 
Table 5 clearly illustrates the fact that if the price elasticity of demand is low in 
absolute terms, the impact of an increase in the tax on consumption will be limited, 
but the impact on government revenue will be large. On the other hand, if the demand 
for the product is relatively price elastic, an increase in the tax will result in a sharp 
decrease in consumption, but the increase in government revenue will be less 
pronounced. However, Table 5 clearly indicates that for any price elasticity of 
demand for cigarettes between 0 and –1.5 an increase in the tax on cigarettes will 
result in a decrease in tobacco consumption and an increase in government revenue. 
There is no trade-off. The interests of both the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of 
Health are served. The only “trade-off” is to determine the relative magnitudes of the 
gains to be achieved by the two ministries. All else the same, the Ministry of Health 
would want the price elasticity to be high, because a given increase in the tax will 
then cause a larger decrease in smoking. On the other hand, the Ministry of Finance 
might wish for a lower price elasticity, because this would mean that a given increase 
in the tax would result in a relatively greater increase in government revenue. 
 
Can the government increase the tax n cigarettes indefinitely? Presumably not. 
However, given Jamaica’s current cigarette tax burden of less than 45 per cent, there 
is ample room for a significant increase in the tax burden. Some simulations are 
shown in Table 6. In this table the impact of an increase in the tax burden on 
cigarettes is shown for the following: the retail price of cigarettes, consumption of 
cigarettes, and government revenue. This table is compiled on the assumption that the 
price elasticity of demand is –0.5, and that the industry keeps the real industry price at 
 30 
the same level. As was discussed in a previous footnote, should the industry decide to 
increase the industry price in line with the increase in the tax the public health benefit 
will be enhanced, while the government revenue benefit will be tempered from the 
values shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 suggests that the government of Jamaica can increase its revenues from 
cigarettes by more than 70 per cent if it increases the tax burden from the current level 
of 42 per cent to around 67.5 per cent. The public health implication of such a move 
would be immense. Tobacco consumption would decrease by nearly 40 per cent from 
current levels. Cigarette prices would increase by about 77 per cent in real terms. 
 
Is such a high tax burden realistic and sustainable? If one considers the experience of 
other countries, this clearly seems to be the case. In countries like the UK and some 
Scandinavian countries the government has imposed taxes as high as 75 per cent of 
the retail price (Chaloupka, et al., 1999: 239-240). In fact, the minimum tax burden on 
cigarettes in the European Union is currently 57 per cent of the retail price. 
 
Should Jamaica decide to impose a cigarette tax equal to the minimum EU tax, it 
would have to increase the current tax by 79 per cent, again assuming that the tobacco 
industry will keep the real industry price constant. Assuming a price elasticity of –0.5, 
the result of such a tax increase would be to decrease cigarette consumption by 16.9 
per cent and increase real government revenue by 49 per cent. 
 
Table 6: Implications of raising the tax on cigarettes 
Tax burden (tax 
as percentage 
of retail price) 
Percentage 
change in the 














45.0 10.3 127 -2.2 7.91 
47.5 22.0 133 -4.7 16.29 
50.0 34.9 140 -7.4 24.85 
52.5 49.0 147 -10.4 33.48 
55.0 64.8 156 -13.8 42.07 
57.5 82.4 165 -17.6 50.42 
60.0 102.3 175 -21.8 58.23 
62.5 124.8 187 -26.6 65.06 
65.0 150.4 200 -32.0 70.23 
67.5 180.1 216 -38.3 72.70 
70.0 214.7 234 -45.7 70.86 
 31 
72.5 255.5 255 -54.4 62.12 
75.0 304.6 280 -64.8 42.24 
Note: it is assumed that the real industry price is unaffected. All percentage changes are 
taken from the base situation in 2001 
 
Table 6 does not necessarily suggest a “big bang” once-off tax increase. A phased 
approach can be equally successful. In South Africa the government phased in the tax 
increases over a period of four years. Between 1994 and 1998, when the government-
set target of 50 per cent tax burden was achieved in South Africa, the real retail price 
had increased by 57 per cent, aggregate cigarette consumption had decreased by 15 
per cent, per capita consumption had decreased by 20 per cent and real government 
revenue from tobacco taxes had increased by 75 per cent (ETCSA, 2003: 52). 
 
If tobacco control is an important policy and public health goal, the government of 
Jamaica would do well to announce “tax burden target” and take active steps to 
achieve the target within a number of years. 
 
6. POSSIBLE CONCERNS 
 
From an economic point of view, the policy prescriptions for an effective tobacco 
control strategy are clear-cut. Of all the interventions available, and there are many, as 
was discussed in section 4.1 (a), by far the most effective and most cost-effective 
intervention is an increase in the tax on cigarettes. The experiences of other countries 
and the simulation exercises presented in this paper clearly indicate that an increase in 
the tax on cigarettes will reduce the consumption of cigarettes and will increase 
government revenue. It is a win-win situation; there is no trade-off.  
 
However, the crucial element is the political will to stand against the vested interests 
of the tobacco industry. International experience has shown that the tobacco industry 
will aggressively fight any intervention that will reduce their profitability. The 
tobacco industry will say that they support “sensible legislation” and interventions 
like educational campaigns to warn school children against the dangers of smoking. 
While one should not dismiss such educational campaigns out of hand, the fact of the 
matter is that such campaigns are not nearly as effective in curbing smoking 
compared to interventions such as clean indoor air legislation, advertising bans and 
 32 
tax increases. As a rule of thumb, the more vigorously a tobacco control intervention 
is opposed by the tobacco industry, the more effective that intervention is likely to be. 
 
The industry will typically fight an increase in tobacco taxation on the following 
grounds: 
a) It will stimulate the smuggling of cigarettes; 
b) The decrease in consumption will result in a decrease in government revenue; 
c) Jobs will be lost; and 
d) The increased tax will hurt the poor, because smoking prevalence is generally 
higher among the poor than the rich. 
 
While all these concerns have an element of truth, they do not nullify the policy 
proposal made in this paper. In the following sections these concerns will be analysed 
in more detail. 
 
a) Smuggling issues 
 
There is some evidence that differences in prices between states (especially in the US) 
and countries (e.g. between France and the UK) encourages some people to bootleg 
cigarettes from the low-price area to the high-price area. However, this is not the main 
problem. The far more serious issue concerns the smuggling of large quantities of 
untaxed cigarettes by crime syndicates. Often these cigarettes are exported tax-free, 
only to be smuggled into the original exporting country. 
 
While certainly not all cigarette smuggling is orchestrated by the tobacco industry, 
there is substantial evidence that the tobacco industry has been actively involved in 
the smuggling of cigarettes. Internal documents by the industry clearly indicate that 
the industry was often aware of smuggling activities and, in fact, often played an 
active role in smuggling in order to open up new markets (see Hammond and Rowell, 
2001). 
 
The solution to the smuggling problem is not a reduction in tax rates, but better law 
enforcement. This is one of the key recommendations of the Framework Convention 
for Tobacco Control.  
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b) A decrease in government revenue? 
 
It is true that if tobacco disappears completely, then government revenue from the 
taxation of tobacco will decrease to zero. While this might be the long-term public 
health aim, this is clearly not going to happen overnight. In fact, given the addictive 
properties of nicotine, cigarettes will be around for at least the next 50 years, simply 
because some people are unable to quit. 
 
Even in areas where a variety of stringent anti-smoking measures have been in place 
for a long time, such as British Columbia, California and New York State, smoking 
prevalence is still above 15 per cent. This suggests that there is some “threshold 
percentage” of smokers that would continue to smoke, despite all the tobacco control 
interventions. The tobacco industry will certainly not disappear, even if taxes are 
increasing rapidly, despite the industry’s claims that the taxes are excessive and will 
eventually lead to a decrease in government revenue. 
 
c) Employment issues 
 
The comment is often made that the cigarette tax increase will cause a decrease in 
employment. While this statement sounds plausible at first, it focuses on only one 
sector of the economy, namely the tobacco sector. It is true that a large reduction in 
the demand for tobacco is likely to result in jobs being lost in the tobacco sector. 
 
However, an important aspect, and one that the tobacco industry does not emphasise, 
is that the money that was previously spent on tobacco products does not disappear 
from the economy, but is used to buy other goods and services. The increased demand 
for such goods and services will increase the demand for labour in these sectors. 
Unfortunately it is virtually impossible to say precisely which jobs have been created 
because of consumers switching away from tobacco to other goods and services. 
However, a number of studies (see survey in Van der Merwe, 1998b: 203-206) have 
used macroeconomic models, input-output tables and social accounting matrices to 
investigate what would happen to overall employment should the tobacco sector 
disappear and people divert their expenditure to other goods and services. They all 
 34 
found that overall employment would be enhanced because the more people would be 
employed in other sectors of the economy than the number of employment 
opportunities that are lost in the tobacco and related industries. The reason is quite 
intuitive: relative to other industries the tobacco industry is more capital intensive. 
The goods and services to which ex-smokers would shift their expenditure are 
relatively more labour intensive, which means that the gains in employment in these 
industries exceed the loss of employment in the tobacco and related sectors  
 
d) Do taxes hurt the poor? 
 
It could be argued that increasing the tax on cigarettes will hurt the poor because, 
firstly, the poor tend to smoke more than the rich, and secondly, the poor spend a 
relatively higher percentage of their disposable income on tobacco products than the 
rich. This implies that the tax on cigarettes is regressive, i.e. the tax burden is heavier 
on the poor vis-à-vis the rich. While this is generally not disputed, tobacco control 
economists would argue that the solution to the regressivity of the tax on cigarettes is 
not to decrease the tax, but rather to increase it. As was pointed out in section 4.1 (a) 
there is ample empirical evidence to indicate that the poor are generally more price 
sensitive than the rich, and would thus reduce their consumption by a greater 
percentage in reaction to a given increase in the tax.  
 
The implication is that an increase in the tax on cigarettes decreases the degree of 
regressivity. Also, by cutting back on their smoking, the poor reduce their risk of 
incurring a range of diseases, each of which carries a high cost, specifically in terms 




The aim of this paper was to investigate the economics of tobacco control in Jamaica. 
Despite the fact that tobacco consumption has been decreasing consistently over the 
past 30 years, this paper pointed out that increases in the tax on tobacco would 
decrease cigarette consumption further and result in a significant increase in 
government revenue.  
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It was impossible to obtain a precise estimate of the price elasticity of demand, but all 
econometric specifications indicate that the price elasticity for cigarettes is relatively 
inelastic, but certainly not perfectly inelastic. Given the current cigarette tax regime 
and the price elasticity estimates, an increase in the tax on cigarettes will result in a 
decrease in cigarette consumption and an increase in government revenue. In fact, 
should the government of Jamaica decide to increase the tax by 10 per cent, 
consumption is likely to decrease by X per cent and government revenue will increase 
by Y per cent. 
 
The analysis indicates that the government can increase its revenues by raising the tax 
burden to about 67.5 per cent of the retail price. Given the current tax burden of about 
42 per cent, this gives the government of Jamaica much scope to increase the cigarette 
tax. 
 
An increase in the tax on cigarettes is by no means the only way to reduce cigarette 
consumption. A number of additional methods exist, such as a ban on advertising, 
restrictions on smoking in public places, more awareness of the risks associated with 
smoking, restrictions on the tar and nicotine content, etc. However, none of these 
legislative interventions are as potent as an increase in the tax. 
 
However, despite the clear economic benefits of increasing the tax on cigarettes, 
many governments are slow to change their tax policies, often because of pressure 
exerted by the industry. The arguments that the industry presents are often flawed and 
can be easily countered. The single most important ingredient in an effective tobacco 
control strategy is the political will to stand against a powerful and influential 
industry. It is hoped that this study will persuade the Ministries of Health and Finance 
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Regression results for different specifications of the demand for cigarettes in 
Jamaica 
 
The following variables are used: 
CIGCONSUMPTION Aggregate cigarette consumption, expressed in 
thousands of units; 
PC_CIGCONSUMPTION: Per capita cigarette consumption, where the 
population is defined as all people aged above 15 
years, expressed in units per person above age 15; 
GDP95: Gross domestic product, expressed in millions of 
constant 1995 Jamaica dollars; 
PC_GDP95: Per capita GDP, where the population is defined as 
all people aged above 15 years, expressed in 
constant 1995 Jamaica dollars; and 
CIGPRICE95: Price of a pack of 20 cigarettes, deflated by the 
Consumer Price Index (1995 = 100). 
 
Equation 1 
Dependent Variable: LOG(CIGCONSUMPTION) 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1974 2001 
Included observations: 28 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 15.85317 1.602324 9.893859 0.0000 
LOG(CIGPRICE95) -0.478544 0.103070 -4.642898 0.0001 
LOG(GDP95) 0.003696 0.144469 0.025582 0.9798 
R-squared 0.518456     Mean dependent var 14.04056 
Adjusted R-squared 0.479933     S.D. dependent var 0.107930 
S.E. of regression 0.077835     Akaike info criterion -2.167504 
Sum squared resid 0.151456     Schwarz criterion -2.024768 
Log likelihood 33.34506     F-statistic 13.45818 




Dependent Variable: CIGCONSUMPTION 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1974 2001 
Included observations: 28 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 1839749. 169635.6 10.84531 0.0000 
CIGPRICE95 -12115.38 2592.444 -4.673344 0.0001 
GDP95 0.083569 1.058235 0.078970 0.9377 
R-squared 0.522208     Mean dependent var 1259437. 
Adjusted R-squared 0.483985     S.D. dependent var 136052.9 
S.E. of regression 97732.47     Akaike info criterion 25.91881 
Sum squared resid 2.39E+11     Schwarz criterion 26.06155 
Log likelihood -359.8634     F-statistic 13.66203 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.023284     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000098 
 
Equation 3 
Dependent Variable: LOG(CIGCONSUMPTION) 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1975 2001 
Included observations: 27 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 9.515399 3.218692 2.956294 0.0071 
LOG(CIGCONSUMP
TION(-1)) 
0.426510 0.182347 2.339003 0.0284 
LOG(CIGPRICE95) -0.219392 0.128063 -1.713155 0.1001 
LOG(GDP95) -0.051508 0.129918 -0.396466 0.6954 
R-squared 0.588836     Mean dependent var 14.03222 
Adjusted R-squared 0.535206     S.D. dependent var 0.100361 
S.E. of regression 0.068422     Akaike info criterion -2.390297 
Sum squared resid 0.107675     Schwarz criterion -2.198321 
Log likelihood 36.26901     F-statistic 10.97957 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.937476     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000113 
 
Equation 4 
Dependent Variable: CIGCONSUMPTION 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1975 2001 
Included observations: 27 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 1076541. 356298.7 3.021457 0.0061 
CIGCONSUMPTION(
-1) 
0.405956 0.176305 2.302581 0.0307 
CIGPRICE95 -5669.599 3111.361 -1.822225 0.0815 
GDP95 -0.359237 0.921734 -0.389740 0.7003 
R-squared 0.599507     Mean dependent var 1247977. 
Adjusted R-squared 0.547269     S.D. dependent var 124109.7 
S.E. of regression 83507.56     Akaike info criterion 25.63922 
Sum squared resid 1.60E+11     Schwarz criterion 25.83119 
Log likelihood -342.1294     F-statistic 11.47641 




Dependent Variable: LOG(PC_CIGCONSUMPTION) 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1974 2001 
Included observations: 28 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 4.594506 3.791113 1.211915 0.2369 
LOG(CIGPRICE95) -0.981293 0.182545 -5.375607 0.0000 
LOG(PC_GDP95) 0.510734 0.285528 1.788739 0.0858 
R-squared 0.724176     Mean dependent var 6.749786 
Adjusted R-squared 0.702110     S.D. dependent var 0.229830 
S.E. of regression 0.125440     Akaike info criterion -1.213028 
Sum squared resid 0.393377     Schwarz criterion -1.070292 
Log likelihood 19.98240     F-statistic 32.81870 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.676197     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
Equation 6 
Dependent Variable: PC_CIGCONSUMPTION 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1974 2001 
Included observations: 28 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 792.2332 345.5018 2.292993 0.0305 
CIGPRICE95 -14.25978 3.181539 -4.482040 0.0001 
PC_GDP95 0.006624 0.001972 3.358394 0.0025 
R-squared 0.732301     Mean dependent var 876.4263 
Adjusted R-squared 0.710886     S.D. dependent var 210.3420 
S.E. of regression 113.0995     Akaike info criterion 12.39537 
Sum squared resid 319787.6     Schwarz criterion 12.53811 
Log likelihood -170.5352     F-statistic 34.19432 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.573137     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
Equation 7 
Dependent Variable: LOG(PC_CIGCONSUMPTION) 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1975 2001 
Included observations: 27 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 3.065212 2.830941 1.082754 0.2901 
LOG(PC_CIGCONSU
MPTION(-1)) 
0.758793 0.122345 6.202092 0.0000 
LOG(CIGPRICE95) -0.233615 0.169326 -1.379671 0.1810 
LOG(PC_GDP95) -0.047718 0.216849 -0.220050 0.8278 
R-squared 0.883281     Mean dependent var 6.731482 
Adjusted R-squared 0.868057     S.D. dependent var 0.212396 
S.E. of regression 0.077151     Akaike info criterion -2.150158 
Sum squared resid 0.136901     Schwarz criterion -1.958182 
Log likelihood 33.02713     F-statistic 58.01806 




Dependent Variable: PC_CIGCONSUMPTION 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1975 2001 
Included observations: 27 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 366.6249 252.9986 1.449118 0.1608 
PC_CIGCONSUMPTI
ON(-1) 
0.758813 0.111510 6.804860 0.0000 
CIGPRICE95 -3.161031 2.552372 -1.238468 0.2280 
PC_GDP95 -0.000221 0.001625 -0.136331 0.8927 
R-squared 0.890518     Mean dependent var 857.0475 
Adjusted R-squared 0.876237     S.D. dependent var 187.1521 
S.E. of regression 65.83995     Akaike info criterion 11.34828 
Sum squared resid 99702.68     Schwarz criterion 11.54026 
Log likelihood -149.2018     F-statistic 62.35983 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.308269     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
 
 
